Iran’s high-risk war strategy seems to centre on endurance and deterrence
Iran’s high-risk war strategy seems to centre on endurance and deterrence
Iran’s military stance in an expanding conflict with Israel and the US indicates a focus on survival rather than traditional battlefield triumphs. The goal is not to achieve outright victory, but to ensure the country’s continued existence according to its own standards. Iranian leaders and military planners have long anticipated such a scenario, recognizing that their regional aspirations could lead to direct clashes with either Israel or the US, with the other likely joining in. This dynamic was visible last summer, when Israel initiated strikes and the US intervened days later. In the current phase, the strikes originated from both sides simultaneously.
Given the overwhelming technological and military advantages of the US and Israel, it would be unrealistic to assume Iranian strategists aimed for a straightforward win. Instead, their plan revolves around deterrence and resilience. Over the past decade, Iran has focused on building a multi-tiered missile system, deploying long-range drones, and cultivating alliances with armed groups across the Middle East. This strategy acknowledges Iran’s limitations, such as its inability to reach US mainland, but highlights its capacity to target American bases in nearby Arab nations. Israel, too, falls within range of Iranian projectiles, and recent confrontations show vulnerabilities in its air defense.
Each missile or drone that penetrates these defenses carries more than just military significance; it also exerts psychological pressure. The economic dimension of this conflict plays a crucial role in Iran’s calculations. Interceptors used by Israel and the US are significantly costlier than the one-way missiles and drones Iran employs. Prolonged fighting forces these powers to deplete valuable resources against relatively inexpensive threats. Energy remains a key strategic asset, as the Strait of Hormuz is vital for global oil and gas flow. Even partial disruptions or credible threats can elevate oil prices and intensify demands for peace.
Escalation thus serves as a tool to increase the cost of sustaining the war, not necessarily to eliminate opponents. Attacks on Gulf states like Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, Oman, and Iraq are likely intended to demonstrate that supporting US forces involves risks. Tehran hopes these governments will urge Washington to scale back operations. However, this approach risks solidifying the alliances of these states with the US and Israel, potentially isolating Iran further in the long term. The gamble lies in whether restraint signals weakness or strength.
Reports of local commanders operating with independent decision-making suggest a decentralized command structure. This does not imply a breakdown in leadership, but rather a deliberate design to maintain functionality during intense attacks. The IRGC’s doctrine has long embraced this model, ensuring operational continuity even if key figures are eliminated. Communication lines are susceptible to interference, senior leaders have been targeted, and air dominance by the US and Israel hampers centralized control. Pre-approved target lists and delegated launch authority could safeguard against a complete collapse of command.
Yet decentralization introduces uncertainties. Commanders acting without full situational awareness might strike unintended targets, including neutral states. The lack of a unified strategic overview raises the likelihood of errors. If this pattern persists, it could lead to loss of coordination. Iran’s strategy hinges on the assumption that it can endure sustained attacks, but this requires careful execution to avoid unintended consequences that might outweigh its gains.
